


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Analyzing the impact of labor market integration

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Abstract

We develop a competitive search model involving multiple regions, geographically mobile workers, and moving costs. Equilibrium mobility patterns are analyzed and characterized, indicating that shocks to a particular region, such as a productivity shock, can propagate to other regions through workers' mobility. Moreover, equilibrium mobility patterns are not efficient due to the existence of moving costs, implying that they affect social welfare not only because they are costs but also because they distort equilibrium allocation. By calibrating our framework to Japanese regional data, we demonstrate that the impacts of eliminating migration costs are comparable to those of a 30% productivity increase.

Keywords: geographical mobility of workers, competitive job search, moving costs, labor market integration

JEL Classification Numbers: J61, J64, R23

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1 Introduction

This study analyzes the possible impacts of regional labor market integration on local and national labor markets and social welfare. As observed in many countries, there exists considerable labor mobility within a country, and such migration has been shown to be sensitive to local labor market conditions.¹ We then naturally expect that migration should eventually eliminate regional differences in labor market conditions, such as those in wages and unemployment rates. However, contrary to this expectation, we observe persistent and significant differences in such labor market outcomes. For instance, Lkhagvasuren [8] showed that the magnitude of cross-state unemployment differences is approximately identical with the cyclical variation in the national unemployment rate.²

Migration sensitivity to labor market conditions and the persistent regional differences in labor market outcomes imply that regional labor markets are only imperfectly integrated, which is primarily attributed to the existence of moving costs in general. Such moving costs include those related to job turnover, which depends on institution and regulations affecting labor markets, such as mutual recognition of professional degrees among different regions and occupational licenser requirements, those of moving, selling, and finding houses, which may depend on transportation and communication technology, and those of adjusting to a new environment and re-constructing social networks. The aim of this paper is to qualify and quantify the effects of moving costs on local and national labor markets.³

We develop a competitive search model involving multiple regions and moving costs. As modeled in Acemoglu and Shimer [1] [2] and Moen [14], firms post wages when opening their vacancies and job search is directed.⁴ Search is off-the-job and only unemployed workers can move between regions. Although job seekers can search jobs (i.e., can access information on vacancies) both within and outside their places of residence, a new job in a region different from their initial places of residence incurs moving costs.

Our analysis first examines the qualitative effects of moving costs on migration patterns. The intriguing result is that a change in moving costs results in spillover effects through migration responses, resulting in a counter-intuitive result: better access from one region to another that is characterized as

¹For earlier contributions on this issue, see Blanchard and Katz [4], Borjas et al [5], and Topel [24] among others. Recent contributions include Hatton and Tani [7], Kennan and Walker [9], and Rabe and Taylor [21].

²The same holds true for Japanese prefectures. Population census of Japan reports prefectural unemployment rates every five years. The coefficients of variation of cross-prefecture unemployment in 1985, 1995, and 2005 are approximately 0.35, 0.31, and 0.23, respectively. That of time series unemployment from 1985 to 2005 is 0.27.

³In the international context, the degree of labor market integration also depends on the formation of political and economic unions such as the European Union. Although we base our arguments on migration within a nation in this study, our framework is applicable to such unions as well.

⁴See, among others, Rogerson et al [22] for recent developments in the literature on job search models that include a competitive search model.

having better economic conditions, such as higher productivity, may negatively affect the source region. It increases job settlements from the source region to the better region whereas it decreases job settlements to other regions, which may result in a higher unemployment rate in the source region. Hence, an access improvement between two regions may widen the difference between the two regions.

Second, equilibrium of the model is shown to be inefficient: Migration flow is insufficient when the destination (resp. source) region poses a relatively high (resp. low) asset value of an unemployed worker. A high asset value of an unemployed worker in the destination region implies that in-migration of job seekers to the region is socially beneficial. However, firms in the destination region ignore such migration benefits when opening their vacancies, resulting in insufficient job settlements and migration. When the asset value of an unemployed worker in the source region is low, out-migration of job seekers from the region is socially beneficial. Again, firms in the destination region ignore such benefits when opening vacancies, resulting in insufficient migration. Thus, migration costs reduces social welfare not only because they decrease social surplus when migration takes place but also because they distorts the equilibrium allocation.

Furthermore, we demonstrate how to quantify losses from moving costs. For this, we calibrate our framework to Japanese prefectural data and then consider a counterfactual experiment in which local labor markets are fully integrated and moving costs do not exist. The counterfactual analysis indicates that such integration has a significant impact on unemployment and welfare, which are comparable to those caused by a 30% productivity increase.

Several previous studies investigated the role of migration and possible effects of labor market integration. Lkhagvasuren [8] extended the island model of Lucas and Prescott [10] by introducing job search frictions in each island as modeled in the Mortensen-Pissarides model.⁵ In Lkhagvasuren's model, a worker's productivity is subject to a shock specific to the worker-location match. Therefore, a job seeker hit by a negative productivity shock may have the incentive to move to other islands even if her/his current location offers high probability of finding jobs, leading to a possibility of simultaneous in- and out-migration. Using this framework, he showed that regional differences in the unemployment rate may persist, regardless of high labor mobility between regions, and that labor mobility is procyclical. Although our model is similar to that developed in Lkhagvasuren [8] in the sense that both exhibit labor mobility and regional unemployment differences simultaneously, they are different in focus: We uncover the possible role of moving costs in determining migration patterns, whereas he examined the role of productivity shocks.

In immigration literature, Ortega [18] developed a two-country job search model in which workers could decide where to search for jobs. The workers need to incur moving costs if they search for jobs

⁵For details on the Mortensen-Pissarides model, see, among others, Mortensen and Pissarides [16] and Pissarides [20].

abroad. Differences in the job separation rate may incentivize workers in the high job separation country to migrate to the low job separation country. Because wages are determined by Nash bargaining, firms expect to make low wage payments to immigrants having high search costs, thereby incentivizing them to increase vacancies. Thus, incentives to migrate and increase vacancies reinforce each other, resulting in Pareto-ranked multiple equilibria. In contrast, we employ a competitive search model in which wages are posted and search is directed. This modeling strategy results in a unique equilibrium, enabling us to focus on the analysis of geographical mobility patterns.

The following studies highlight the positive effects of labor market integration on human capital accumulation and specialization. Miyagiwa [12], in the context of immigration between countries, showed that if economies of scale exist in education, skilled worker migration benefits the host region by increasing the skilled labor ratio, whereas it negatively influences the source region by discouraging skill formation. In such an environment, regional integration represented by reductions in moving costs induces people in the host region to invest more in human capital whereas it discourages people in the source region from investing in it. Wildasin [25] presented a multi-region model in which human capital investment increases specialization but exposes skilled workers to region specific earnings risk. He then showed that the skilled workers' mobility across regions mitigates such risk and improves efficiency, and examined how the ways of financing investments, such as local taxes, affect efficiency. However, the simple treatment of migration decisions in these studies fail to provide a solid and detailed analysis of migration patterns and their efficiency properties, which we focus on in this study.

Our quantitative analysis is also related to recent studies such as Bayer and Juessen [3], Coen-Pirani [6], and Kennan and Walker [9]. Bayer and Juessen [3] and Kennan and Walker [9] estimated partial equilibrium models in which worker's moving decisions are motivated by idiosyncratic and location-specific factors. Bayer and Juessen [3], in particular, share common aspects with our quantitative analysis: They obtained a moving cost estimate, which is approximately two-thirds the average annual household income, and considered a counterfactual experiment in which moving costs are set to zero. They focus on the effects on moving flows: Moving cost elimination increases the U.S. interstate migration rate from 3.7% to 12.6% in the baseline case. In contrast, we focus on the general equilibrium effects of moving costs, which is in common with Coen-Pirani [6]. Coen-Pirani [6] developed a general equilibrium model of migration based on the island model of Lucas and Prescott [10] to show that the model can replicate several stylized facts regarding moving patterns in the United States. In contrast, we investigate the quantitative impacts of labor market integration on unemployment and welfare.

The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic setups. Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium geographical mobility patterns. Section 4 presents the efficiency property of equilibrium. Section 5 quantifies the effects of moving costs. Section 6 concludes.

2 General settings

Consider H regions (region 1, 2, ..., H) in which there is a continuum of risk-neutral workers of size N . Workers are either employed or unemployed. While employed, workers can not move between regions, whereas unemployed workers can by bearing moving costs t_{ij} . They can seek employment opportunities both beyond and in their region of residence, however, they incur moving costs t_{ij} in case they get employed beyond their region of residence.⁶⁷ We employ the following standard assumptions regarding moving costs: (i) finding a job in the current region of residence incurs no moving cost $t_{ii} = 0$, (ii) moving costs are symmetric, $t_{ij} = t_{ji}$, and (iii) moving costs satisfy the triangle inequality, $t_{ij} \leq t_{ih} + t_{hj}$. Such moving costs include the costs of selling and buying/renting a house and any psychological costs incurred on renewing social networks. This study primarily analyzes the impacts of existence and changes in such moving costs on labor market outcomes and welfare.⁸

We assume that only unemployed workers seek employment opportunities. Once a worker is employed by a firm, the firm-worker pair in region i produces output y_i , where without loss of generality, we assume that a region with a larger number is associated with higher productivity, $y_{i+1} \geq y_i$. A worker exits the economy according to a Poisson process with rate $\delta (> 0)$, who is replaced by a new worker thereby keeping the total population size, N , constant. A new worker enters the economy as an unemployed worker in the same region as her/his parent. The following figure summarizes the structure of the model:

[Figure 1 around here]

2.1 Matching framework

Because arguments are based on a competitive search model, the overall job search market is divided into sub-markets, each of which is characterized by a wage rate, and hence, by a geographical mobility pattern, known as the "block recursivity" (Menzio and Shi [13]; Shi [23]). Job matches accompanied by

⁶We later show that an unemployed worker may move only when she/he gets employed. While being unemployed, she/he has no incentive to move.

⁷Alternatively, we can assume that workers can search for employment opportunities only locally, referred to as the "move then search" regime. In our framework, workers can move between regions while searching for jobs, implying the applicability of this regime. In addition, workers can search for jobs outside of their region of residence, implying that the "search then move" regime is also possible. However, as shown later, only the "search then move" regime emerges in equilibrium. See Molho [15] for a comparison of equilibrium unemployment rates between the "move then search" regime and the "search then move" regime.

⁸One may suspect that migration costs are different across people. Under a competitive search framework, such heterogeneity does not alter our results qualitatively because of the block recursivity that we will refer to in the next section.

migration from region i to region j are generated by a Poisson process with rate $M_{ij} = \mu_j m(u_{ij}, v_{ij})$, where u_{ij} and v_{ij} are the number of unemployed workers who seek employment in region j while living in region i , and the number of vacancies directed at such job searchers, respectively. We call this sub-market as sub-market ij . μ_j represents location-specific matching efficiency. $\mu_j m(\cdot, \cdot)$ is the matching function defined on $\mathbf{R}_+ \times \mathbf{R}_+$, and assumed to be strictly increasing in both arguments, twice differentiable, strictly concave, and homogeneous of degree one. Moreover, we assume that $\mu_j m(\cdot, \cdot)$ satisfies $0 \leq M_{ij} \leq \min[u_{ij}, v_{ij}]$, $\mu_j m(u_{ij}, 0) = \mu_j m(0, v_{ij}) = 0$ and the Inada condition for both arguments.

In each sub-market, worker-job matching occurs at the rate of $p_{ij} = p(\theta_{ij}) = M_{ij}/u_{ij} = \mu_j m(1, \theta_{ij})$ for a job seeker, and $q_{ij} = q(\theta_{ij}) = M_{ij}/v_{ij} = \mu_j m(1/\theta_{ij}, 1)$ for a firm seeking to fill a vacancy. θ_{ij} is the measure of labor market tightness in sub-market ij defined as $\theta_{ij} = v_{ij}/u_{ij}$. From the assumptions regarding $\mu_j m(\cdot, \cdot)$, we obtain that $p_{ij}u_{ij} = q_{ij}v_{ij}$, $dp_{ij}/d\theta_{ij} > 0$ and $dq_{ij}/d\theta_{ij} < 0$ for any $\theta_{ij} \in (0, +\infty)$. We can also see that $\lim_{\theta_{ij} \rightarrow 0} p_{ij} = 0$, $\lim_{\theta_{ij} \rightarrow \infty} p_{ij} = \infty$, $\lim_{\theta_{ij} \rightarrow 0} q_{ij} = \infty$, and $\lim_{\theta_{ij} \rightarrow \infty} q_{ij} = 0$. Moreover, we assume that the elasticity of the firm's contact rate with respect to market tightness, $\eta_{ij} \equiv -(\theta_{ij}/q_{ij})dq_{ij}/d\theta_{ij} = 1 - (\theta_{ij}/p_{ij})dp_{ij}/d\theta_{ij}$, is constant and common across all submarkets ($\eta_{ij} = \eta, \forall i, j$).⁹

2.2 Asset value functions

Let $\rho (> 0)$ denote the discount rate and define r as $r = \delta + \rho$. When locating region i , the asset value functions for an employed worker, $W_i(w)$, an unemployed worker, U_i a firm with a filled position, $J_i(w)$, a firm with a vacancy, V_{ji} , are given by (1)-(4), respectively.

$$rW_i(w) = w, \quad (1)$$

$$rJ_i(w) = y_i - w, \quad (2)$$

$$rU_i = b + \sum_{h=1}^H p_{ih} (W_h(w_{ih}) - U_i - t_{ih}), \quad (3)$$

$$rV_{ji} = -k + q_{ji} (J_i(w_{ji}) - V_{ji}), \quad (4)$$

where b and k represent the flow utility of an unemployed worker, including the value of leisure and unemployment benefits, and the cost of posting a vacancy, respectively. We assume that $y_i > b, \forall i$. Moreover, region i represents the region where agents (i.e., workers and firms) are located, and regions h and j represent the region in which unemployed workers seek employment and firms post vacancies, respectively. Note that the block recursivity divides the labor market into sub-markets, and each sub-market ij is characterized by the combination of the place of residence, i , and the place of job search,

⁹This assumption leads to a set of functions that include the Cobb-Douglas function, which is standard in the literature on theoretical and empirical search models (See Petrongolo and Pissarides [19]).

j . The wage rate may differ between sub-markets within a region and hence the asset values $W_i(w)$ and $J_i(w)$ may also differ: We may observe that $w_{ji} \neq w_{j'i}$, $W_i(w_{ji}) \neq W_i(w_{j'i})$, and $J_i(w_{ji}) \neq J_i(w_{j'i})$ ($j \neq j'$). In (3), the second term represents the sum of expected gains in the asset values from finding jobs net of moving costs. Thus, the moving costs are described as reductions in asset values.¹⁰ In (4), V_{ji} depends on the firm's location, i , and the location of posting a vacancy, j .

2.3 Equilibrium

Because this is a competitive search model, that is, firms post wages and search is directed, the job search market in each region is divided into sub-markets according to the migration pattern. An unemployed worker in region i chooses sub-markets to search for jobs in order to maximize her/his asset value. In so doing, she/he can search for jobs in multiple sub-markets.¹¹ In equilibrium, the asset value in region i takes the same value U_i regardless of the submarkets that she/he choose.

A firm providing a vacancy determines its wage to post while anticipating the market response: it regards U_i as given and takes the relationship between w_{ij} and θ_{ij} that is determined by (3) into consideration. The firm's decision is described as follows:

$$\max_{w_{ij}, \theta_{ij}} V_{ij} \quad \text{s.t. (3), where } U_i \text{ is treated as given.}$$

Using (1), (2), and (4), this optimization is written as

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{w_{ij}, \theta_{ij}} & -k + q_{ij} \left(\frac{y_j - w_{ij}}{r} - V_{ij} \right) \\ \text{s.t. } rU_i &= b + \sum_{h=1}^H p_{ih} \left(\frac{w_{ih}}{r} - U_i - t_{ih} \right), \text{ where } U_i \text{ is treated as given.} \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

The related first-order conditions are given by

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &= -q_{ij} - \lambda p_{ij}, \\ 0 &= \frac{dq_{ij}}{d\theta_{ij}} \left(\frac{y_j - w_{ij}}{r} - V_{ij} \right) - \lambda \frac{dp_{ij}}{d\theta_{ij}} \left(\frac{w_{ij}}{r} - U_i - t_{ij} \right). \end{aligned}$$

We assume free entry and exit of firms, which drives the asset value of posting a vacancy to zero: $V_{ij} = 0$.

The first-order conditions then yield the wage rate posted by a firm in sub-market ij :

$$w_{ij} = \eta y_j + (1 - \eta) r (U_i + t_{ij}). \quad (6)$$

Thus, for a given market tightness, the wage rate becomes higher as the productivity, y_j , asset value of an unemployed worker, U_i , and moving cost, t_{ij} , increase. A higher y_j enables a firm to offer a higher

¹⁰Alternatively, we can assume that a mover need to pay flow costs of moving until she/he exits the economy. This alternation does not change any of our results.

¹¹From the assumption of the Poisson process, the probability that an unemployed worker obtains multiple offers at a time is zero.

wage rate whereas a higher U_i or t_{ij} requires a firm to pay higher compensation in order to attract job applicants. Plugging (6) into the zero-profit condition, $V_{ij} = 0$, we obtain

$$rk = q_{ij} (1 - \eta) (y_j - rU_i - rt_{ij}). \quad (7)$$

Of course, there may be some region j where $y_j - rt_{ij} - rU_i \leq 0$. In such a case, no vacancy is posted in sub-market ij and $p_{ij} = 0$.

We focus on the steady state. Although the total population is constant, the population in each region may change over time. Here, the steady state requires that the unemployment rate in each region, un_i , is constant. The dynamics of the unemployment rate are given by $du_n/d\tau = \delta - un_{i\tau} (\delta + \sum_h p_{ih\tau})$, where τ represents time. This yields the steady state level of unemployment rate as

$$un_i = \frac{\delta}{\delta + \sum_{h=1}^H p_{ih}}. \quad (8)$$

Once the asset value of an unemployed worker, U_i , is given, other endogenous variables are well determined: (7) uniquely determines the market tightness, θ_{ij} . Then, (6) and (8) give the wage and unemployment rates, w_{ij} and un_i , respectively. The asset values other than U_i are determined accordingly.

The wage equation (6) is rewritten as

$$(1 - \eta)(y_j - rt_{ij} - rU_i) = y_j - w_{ij}. \quad (9)$$

Using this, we can rearrange the zero-profit condition (7) as

$$rk = q_{ij}(y_j - w_{ij}). \quad (10)$$

Substituting (1), (10), and $q_{ij} = p_{ij}/\theta_{ij}$ into (3), we can rewrite the asset value of an unemployed worker, (3), as

$$rU_i = b + \sum_{h=1}^H \left[p_{ih} \left(\frac{y_h}{r} - U_i - t_{ih} \right) - k\theta_{ih} \right]. \quad (11)$$

Equations (9) and (10) imply that θ_{ij} is a function of U_i for all j . Thus, (11) implicitly determines U_i . The following proposition establishes the existence and uniqueness of the solution:

Proposition 1 *The steady state equilibrium exists and is unique.*

Proof. See Appendix A. ■

3 Equilibrium properties

Here, we summarize several equilibrium properties that are worth listing, thereby focusing on interior solutions though we can obtain qualitatively the same results as those obtained below even if we allow corner solutions.

3.1 Migration patterns

In equilibrium, we can confirm that unemployed workers, while searching for a job, do not have the incentive to migrate:

Proposition 2 *The difference between the asset value of an unemployed worker in region i and that in region j is smaller than the moving costs between the two regions:*

$$t_{ij} \geq |U_i - U_j|, \quad \forall i, j \in H,$$

where the equality holds true if and only if $t_{ij} = 0$.

Proof. See Appendix B. ■

Thus, we know that migration takes place only when unemployed workers find jobs. Moreover, this proposition implies that if there is no moving cost ($t_{ij} = 0, \forall i, j$), the asset value of an unemployed worker is the same across regions. From (9) and (10), θ_{ij} and p_{ij} are also the same across regions, which, combined with (8), results in equalization of regional unemployment rates.

The probability of such migration depends on the difference between the social gains from making a match, $y_j - rt_{ij} - rU_i$, which is the output of a match minus the value of an unemployed worker and the related moving costs, as well as the matching efficiency of the destination region, μ_j :

Proposition 3 *The job finding rate associated with migration from region i to region j increases as the social gains from a match and the location specific matching efficiency increase:*

$$p_{ij} > p_{i'j'} \quad \text{if } y_j - rt_{ij} - rU_i > y_{j'} - rt_{i'j'} - rU_{i'} \text{ and } \mu_j \geq \mu_{j'}.$$

Proof. See Appendix C. ■

This proposition has several implications. First, a particular destination attracts people more from a region with low moving costs and a low asset value of an unemployed worker (i.e., in destination j , the job finding rate from region i , p_{ij} , is higher than that from region i' , $p_{i'j}$, if $t_{i'j} + U_{i'} > t_{ij} + U_i$). Second, a destination with low moving costs, high productivity and a high matching efficiency attracts more employed workers from a particular region (i.e., for a job seeker in region i , the job finding rate in region j , p_{ij} , is higher than that in region j' , $p_{ij'}$, if $y_j - rt_{ij} > y_{j'} - rt_{ij'}$ and $\mu_j > \mu_{j'}$). Finally, the net migration from region i to j is positive when the productivity, asset value of the unemployed worker, and matching efficiency are higher in region j than in region i (i.e., $p_{ij} > p_{ji}$ if $y_j + rU_j > y_i + rU_i$ and $\mu_j > \mu_i$).

3.2 Effects of labor market integration and spillover effects of productivity shocks through migration

Nest, we examine the effects of regional labor market integration. In our framework, the labor market integration is described by a reduction in moving costs t_{ij} .

Proposition 4 *A reduction in moving costs from region i to region j , t_{ij} , (i) increases the asset value of an unemployed worker in region i , U_i , (ii) increases the job finding rate from region i to region j , p_{ij} , but decreases that from region i to region $j' \neq j$, $p_{ij'}$ ($j' \neq j$), (iii) decreases the wage rate when finding a job in region j from region i , w_{ij} , but increases the wage rate when finding a job in other regions, $w_{ij'}$, and (iv) has ambiguous effects on the unemployment rate in region i , un_i .*

Proof. See Appendix D. ■

A reduction in moving costs t_{ij} increases job searchers' gains in region i from a job match in region j , increasing the asset value, U_i . From (7), we can see that a reduction in t_{ij} directly increases θ_{ij} (a direct effect) and influences θ_{ij} through changes in U_i (an indirect effect). Although the direct effect positively influences θ_{ij} and increases p_{ij} and the indirect effect has a opposite impact, the direct effect dominates the indirect effect in region j . In other regions, we observe no direct effect, implying that $p_{ij'}$ ($j' \neq j$) unambiguously declines. The wage rate w_{ij} is lower for a lower t_{ij} because firms only have to pay lower compensation in order to attract job seekers from region i to region j , which in turn, implies that firms in other regions need to pay higher wages in order to attract workers from region i . Although a lower moving costs, t_{ij} , implies a higher job finding rate from region i to region j , p_{ij} , it leads to lower job finding rates to other regions, $p_{ij'}$ ($j' \neq j$), through changes in U_i . The former effect lowers the unemployment rate in region i , un_i , whereas the latter effect raises it. When $y_j - rt_{ij}$ is sufficiently large, a change in t_{ij} significantly affects U_i and hence it becomes possible that the latter effect dominates the former. Put differently, a better access from region i to a region with good job opportunities, i.e., a region with high y_j , may reduce job placement flows to other regions and increase the unemployment rate in region i . This is counter-intuitive since we normally expect that such a better access would lower the unemployment rate in the source region. The spillover effects on the job finding rate in other regions give rise to this intriguing result.

Moreover, due to responses of migration flows, a productivity shock in a particular region spills over to other regions.

Proposition 5 *An increase in productivity in region j , y_j , (i) increases the asset value of an unemployed worker in region i ($i \neq j$), U_i , (ii) increases the job finding rate from region i to region j , p_{ij} , but decreases that from region i to region $j' \neq j$, $p_{ij'}$ ($j' \neq j$), (iii) increases not only the wage rate when*

finding a job in region j from region i , w_{ij} , but also the wage rate when finding a job in other regions, $w_{ij'}$, and (iv) has ambiguous effects on the unemployment rate in region i , un_i .

Proof. See Appendix D. ■

Productivity improvement in region j increases the employment flows from all regions into region j , p_{ij} , $\forall i$, which increases the asset values of an unemployed worker in these sending regions, U_i . However, it decreases the employment flows to other regions, i.e., region j' , ($i \neq j'$, $j' \neq j$), $p_{ij'}$. In contrast, it increases the wage rate in all regions while such an effect is most prominent in the region where the productivity shock arises. With higher productivity in region j , firms can afford to post higher wages, forcing

firms in other regions to pay higher wages in order to attract workers. The effect on the unemployment rate, un_i , is again ambiguous because of the opposing effects of changes in p_{ij} and changes in $p_{ij'}$ on un_i . This finding is in contrast to the results of standard job search models with no moving cost, where a positive productivity shock always lowers the unemployment rate (see Rogerson et al [22], for instance).

4 Inefficiency arising from the moving costs

Now we characterize the efficiency of equilibrium. We use the social surplus, S , as the efficiency criterion, which is standard in job search models (See Pissarides [20]). S is the sum of total output and flow utility of unemployed workers minus the costs of posting vacancies and migration:

$$S \equiv \int_0^\infty \sum_{i=1}^H \left[y_i (N_{i\tau} - u_{i\tau}) + bu_{i\tau} - u_{i\tau} \sum_{h=1}^H (k\theta_{ih\tau} + p_{ih\tau}t_{ih}) \right] e^{-\rho\tau} d\tau \quad (12)$$

We start by describing the planner's problem. The social planner maximizes the social surplus subject to the laws of motion of regional population and unemployment:

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{\theta_{ij\tau}, N_{i\tau}, u_{i\tau}} S & (13) \\ \text{s.t. } & \frac{dN_{i\tau}}{d\tau} = \sum_{h=1}^H u_{h\tau} p_{hi\tau} - u_{i\tau} \sum_{h=1}^H p_{ih\tau} \\ & \text{and } \frac{du_{i\tau}}{d\tau} = \delta N_{i\tau} - u_{i\tau} \left(\sum_{h=1}^H p_{ih\tau} + \delta \right) \end{aligned}$$

where τ represents time. Changes in regional population arise from social changes (differences between in-migration $\sum u_{h\tau} p_{hi\tau}$ and out-migration $u_{i\tau} \sum p_{ih\tau}$). Inflows to the unemployment pool are newcomers to the economy and outflows from it are those who get employed. We relegate the derivation of the optimal conditions to Appendix E. After evaluating the first-order conditions for the social planner's maximization at the steady state, we obtain the following proposition:

Proposition 6 Define D_{ij} as

$$D_{ij} \equiv \frac{(1 - \eta) q_{ij}}{r + \eta \sum_{h=1}^H p_{ih}} \left[r (U_i - U_j) + \eta \sum_{h=1}^H p_{ih} (U_h - U_j) \right]. \quad (14)$$

Equilibrium market tightness θ_{ij} is socially optimal if and only if $D_{ij} = 0$ in equilibrium. If and only if $D_{ij} > 0$, θ_{ij} is greater than the optimal tightness. The opposite holds true if and only if $D_{ij} < 0$.

Proof. See Appendix E. ■

Therefore, the equilibrium market tightness θ_{ij} and the job finding rate p_{ij} are insufficient when the destination region has a relatively high asset value of an unemployed worker, U_j , or when the source region has a relatively low U_i . A high asset value of an unemployed worker in the destination region implies that inflows of job seekers to the region are socially beneficial. However, firms ignore such benefits of migration in opening their vacancies, leading to insufficient market tightness. In contrast, when the asset value of an unemployed worker in the source region is low, outflows of job seekers from the region are socially beneficial. Again, firms ignore such benefits in opening vacancies, resulting in insufficient market tightness.

In case of identical moving costs for all migration patterns ($t_{ij} = t, i \neq j, \forall i, j$), migration from any region i to region H , where productivity is the highest, is always too small and that to region 1, where productivity is the lowest, is always too large, and there exists a threshold region $\hat{j}(i)$ for which flows to region $j > \hat{j}(i)$ are too small and flows to region $j \leq \hat{j}(i)$ are too large.¹²

Moreover, Proposition 2 implies that the absence of migration costs ($t_{ij} = 0, \forall i, j$) implies that $U_i = U_j \forall i, j$ and hence $D_{ij} = 0$:

Corollary 7 If there are no migration costs, i.e., $t_{ij} = 0, \forall i, j$, equilibrium is socially optimal.

In the absence of moving costs, our framework becomes a standard competitive search model, of which equilibrium is socially optimal (see Moen [14] and Rogerson et al [22], among others). Thus, moving costs reduce the social surplus not only because they reduce the movers' asset values but also because they distort the equilibrium.

¹²We can prove the result as follows. We readily know that $U_i = U_j$ if $y_i = y_j$. Moreover, (16) proves that

$$\frac{dU_j}{dy_j} - \frac{dU_i}{dy_j} = \frac{p_{jj}}{r + \sum_h p_{jh}} - \frac{p_{ij}}{r + \sum_h p_{ih}}.$$

Proposition 3 implies that $p_{ii} = p_{jj} > p_{ij} = p_{ji}$ and $p_{ih} = p_{jh}$ if $y_i = y_j$, which lead to

$$\left. \frac{dU_j}{dy_j} - \frac{dU_i}{dy_j} \right|_{y_j=y_i} > 0.$$

Hence, the continuity of U_i with respect to $y_j, \forall i, j$, proves that $U_i > U_j$ if $y_i > y_j$. From the assumption that $y_H > \dots > y_{i+1} > y_i > \dots > y_1$, we know that $U_H > \dots > U_{i+1} > U_i > \dots > U_1$. From (14), we readily know that $D_{iH} < 0$ and $D_{i1} > 0$ for all i , and there exists a threshold region $\hat{j}(i)$ for which $D_{ij} < 0$ for $j > \hat{j}(i)$ and $D_{ij} > 0$ for $j \leq \hat{j}(i)$.

5 Quantitative analysis

In this section, we demonstrate how our framework can be used to quantify the overall losses from moving costs. This exercise also serves to reveal the impacts of regional integration on the economy. Here, we calibrate our model to Japanese prefectural data, and provide counterfactual analysis regarding changes in moving costs.

We use data on Japanese prefectures for 2000-2009.¹³ In calibrating our model, we focus on the long-run characteristics of regional labor markets in Japan to ensure that the calibration is consistent with the steady state analysis given in the previous section. More concretely, we focus on the level and regional variation of the unemployment rate averaged over these periods, which are represented in the following figure.

[Figure 2 around here]

The overall unemployment rate of these 46 prefectures averaged over 2000-2009, un_N , is 0.0455, and the unemployment rate of each prefecture ranges from 0.0305 (Fukui prefecture) to 0.064 (Osaka prefecture) (Population Census, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications). The degree of dispersion can be measured by the coefficient of variation: $CV = (1/\bar{un})\sqrt{(1/46)\sum_{i=1}^{46}(un_i - \bar{un})^2}$ where \bar{un} is the average of regional unemployment rates. CV for the regional unemployment rate averaged over 2000-2009 is 0.182, which is somewhat lower than that in the United States.¹⁴ We will examine the extent to which moving costs affect the overall unemployment rate, the dispersion of regional unemployment rates, and welfare.

5.1 Calibration

In the following analysis, we normalize the total population, N , to one. The values of the job separation rate, δ , the regional output per capita, y_i , and the distance between regions, z_{ij} , are taken from the Japanese data: δ is set to 0.16, which is the annual job separation rate in Japan averaged over the years 2000-2009 (Survey on Employment Trends, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare). We employ the per capita gross prefectural domestic product (in million yen, Prefectural Accounts, Department of National

¹³We excluded Okinawa prefecture and used the data on the remaining 46 prefectures. This is because Okinawa prefecture comprises islands and is located extremely far from other prefectures, making it an outlier. In fact, the distance between it and the neighboring prefecture is around 650km whereas in most cases, the distance between two neighboring prefectures is less than 100km. Note here that the distance between prefectures is measured by the distance between the locations of prefectural governments. This elimination reduces the coefficient of variation regarding regional unemployment. For instance, the figure for the year 2000 decreases from 0.232 to 0.172.

¹⁴Lkhagvasuren [8] reported that between January 1976 and May 2011, the coefficient of variation of cross-state unemployment rates in the United States ranges from 0.175 to 0.346 with an average of 0.237.

Accounts, Cabinet Office) as y_i . z_{ij} is measured as the distance (in 100km) between prefectural governments (which is taken on February 20, 2013 from <http://www.gsi.go.jp/KOKUJYOHO/kenchokan.html>, Geographical Information Authority of Japan). We normalize the flow utility of an unemployed worker, b , to one.

We set the value of the discount rate, ρ , to 0.0151, which comes from the average annual interest rate of 10-year national bond of Japan during 2000-2009 (which is taken on February 20, 2013 from http://www.mof.go.jp/jgbs/reference/interest_rate/data/jgbcm_2000-2009.csv, Ministry of Finance). In existing studies such as Coen-Pirani [6], Lkhagvasuren [8], and Kennan and Walker [9], this value is set to 0.04 – 0.05. We will verify the robustness of our results against a higher value of ρ ($\rho = 0.05$).

We specify moving costs, t_{ij} , as a linear function of the distance between prefectures i and j , that is, $t_{ij} = tz_{ij}$, where z_{ij} is the distance between regions and t is a positive constant. We will verify the robustness of our results against a different functional form for moving cost.

In the following quantitative analysis, we employ a Cobb-Douglas form of the matching function, given by $\mu_j m(u_{ij}, v_{ij}) = \mu_j u_{ij}^\eta v_{ij}^{1-\eta}$, where μ_j and η are constants satisfying that $\mu_j > 0$ and $0 < \eta < 1$. As surveyed by Petrongolo and Pissarides [19], the Cobb-Douglas matching function is very standard in the literature of theoretical and empirical search models. We rearrange the matching function as $\ln[\mu_j m(u_{ij}, v_{ij})/u_{ij}] = \ln[\mu_j] + (1 - \eta) \ln[v_{ij}/u_{ij}] = \ln[\mu_j] + (1 - \eta) \ln[\theta_{ij}]$, and estimate it by using the data on job applicants, job openings, and job placements (Monthly Report of Public Employment Security Statistics, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare). Note here that the job seekers' job finding rate $\mu_j m(u_{ij}, v_{ij})/u_{ij}$ is given by the number of job placements per job applicant, and the market tightness θ_{ij} is given by the number of job openings per job applicant. Our spatial units are Japanese prefectures.¹⁵ The Monthly Report of Public Employment Security Statistics reports the number of active job applicants, active job openings, and job placements in every month. To eliminate seasonal volatility, we aggregate monthly data into annual data by taking averages. Because figures for job placements within prefectures are available, we can estimate the matching function $\ln[\mu_j m(u_{ij}, v_{ij})/u_{jj}] = \ln[\mu_j] + (1 - \eta) \ln[\theta_{jj}]$ to obtain $\eta = 0.512$ and μ_j . Details of the estimation are provided in Appendix F. In the benchmark case, we estimate the matching function using the fixed effects (FE) model. We will verify for the possible bias arising from the endogeneity of θ_{jj} .

The remaining two parameters, the moving cost parameter, t , and the cost of providing a vacancy, k , are chosen by targeting the coefficient of variation of the unemployment rate and the overall unemployment rate, which results in $t = 5.348$ and $k = 0.0196$ in the benchmark case. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the parameter values and calibration results, respectively.

[Tables 1 and 2 around here]

¹⁵Here, again, we eliminated Okinawa prefecture from our sample.

In Table 2, we also report the value of social surplus given by (12). Using this calibrated model, we will execute a counterfactual analysis regarding moving costs.

5.2 Counterfactual analysis

In order to see the quantitative impacts of moving costs, we consider the following counterfactual analysis. Assume now that regional labor markets are fully integrated and that there is no moving cost. Thus, we set $t = 0$, keeping other parameters fixed as described in Table 1, and run a counterfactual simulation. We compare the resulting unemployment rate and welfare to the calibrated values shown in the previous sub-section. Eliminating moving costs has the following two effects. First, it directly implies the disappearance of losses from moving and increases the social surplus. Second, as shown in Proposition 6 and Corollary 7, it restores the efficiency of equilibrium by making people more mobile between regions, thereby improving the distribution of the labor force to enhance the job creation efficiency and increase the social surplus.

The results of counterfactual analysis are reported in Table 3.

[Table 3 around here]

As shown in Table 3, in the benchmark case, the overall unemployment rate, un_N , drops by 0.0199 points from 0.0455 to 0.0256, which corresponds to 43.7% decreases. As shown before, when $t = 0$, the unemployment rate is the same across regions, and hence, the coefficient of variation for the regional unemployment rate, CV , becomes zero. The social surplus, S , increases by 104.5 points from 362.0 to 466.5, which corresponds to 28.8% increases. Such large welfare gains arise from the two effects explained above.

In order to appreciate the magnitude of such impacts, we consider an additional counterfactual in which productivity increases in all regions, and compare the changes in the two counterfactuals. In fact, we can see that the effects of labor market integration are comparable to those of a 30% productivity increase. In Table 3, we provide the results of the counterfactual analysis, where output per capita in each region increases by 30%. Such productivity changes results in a 27.9% decrease in un_N , 30.7 percent decrease in CV , and 33.6% increase in S . This result shows that losses from moving costs can be highly significant in a quantitative sense.

5.3 Robustness check

In this section, we discuss the robustness of our results against possible alternative settings.

Endogeneity bias in estimating the matching function

First, as is well known, market tightness, θ_{jj} , i.e., the independent variable in estimating the matching function, $\ln[m(u_{jj}, v_{jj})/u_{jj}] = \ln[\mu_j] + (1 - \eta) \ln[\theta_{jj}]$, is also an endogenous variable in search models. Such endogeneity may bias the estimated coefficient obtained by the standard fixed effects (FE) model. In order to verify the robustness against endogeneity, we conducted a fixed effects instrumental variable (FEIV) estimation. We follow several recent studies that estimated the matching function in using lags of market tightness as instruments (see e.g., Yashiv [26]). As we explain in Appendix F, we used the two-period and three-period lags of market tightness as instruments, and obtained 0.575 as the estimated value of η . Table 4 reports the parameter values in the robustness check.

[Table 4 around here]

In Table 4, the column of Robustness check (1) presents parameter values in the case where the matching function is estimated by FEIV method. Because we obtained 0.512 in the benchmark case (i.e., under FE estimation), FEIV estimation yields a slightly higher value. Still, the main results are highly similar to those of the benchmark case. The results of calibration and counterfactual analysis are provided in the column of Robustness check (1) in Tables 2 and 3. Here, in the absence of moving costs, the unemployment rate, un_N , would be lower by 42.8%, and social surplus, S , would be higher by 29.3%. These figures are again comparable to the effects of a 30% productivity increase, which has effects of lowering un_N by 26.8% and the coefficient of variation of the regional unemployment rates, CV , by 31.3%, and of raising S by 33.6%.

Concave moving costs

Second, we need to examine the degree to which our results depends on the specification of moving costs. In the benchmark case, we specified the moving costs as a linear function of the distance between regions, i.e., $t_{ij} = tz_{ij}$. However, the marginal moving costs may decline with distance because the cost difference between not moving and moving 10km would be significant whereas that between moving 100km and moving 110km may not be so. In order to represent this possibility, we assume a concave function of the distance between regions as the moving costs. More specifically, we use a logarithmic function, i.e., $t_{ij} = t \ln[z_{ij}]$. Parameter values in this case are shown in the column of Robustness check (2) in Table 4. The calibration results and counterfactual analysis are presented in the column of Robustness check (2) of Tables 2 and 3. In this case, if there were no moving cost, un_N would be lower by 72.0%, and S would be higher by 41.2%. In contrast, a 30% productivity increase lowers un_N by 53.6% and CV by 75.2%, and increases S by 25.1%. Thus, we observe that the effects of moving costs are even more significant in this case than in the benchmark case.

Higher discount rate

Third, the value of discount rate, ρ , that we use ($\rho = 0.0151$) is lower than that used in existing studies such as Coen-Pirani [6], Lkhagvasuren [8], and Kennan and Walker [9] ($\rho = 0.04$ or 0.05). This is because the interest rate in Japan was at a unprecedentedly low level in the 2000s. In order to confirm that our results are not attributable to this low discount rate, we run a counterfactual simulation in which the discount rate is higher ($\rho = 0.05$). Parameter values in this case are shown in the column of Robustness check (3) in Table 4. The results of calibration and counterfactual analysis are given in the column of Robustness check (3) of Tables 2 and 3. In this case, if there were no moving cost, un_N would be lower by 44.1%, and S would be higher by 23.3%. In contrast, a 30% productivity increase lowers un_N by 27.9% and CV by 30.7%, and increases S by 33.2%. Again, we confirm the robustness of our results.

Difference in periods

Finally, we check whether our results change depending on the analysis periods. Here, we divide the sample into two periods (2000-2004 and 2005-2009). As we explain in Appendix F, we obtained $\eta = 0.456$ for 2000-2004 and $\eta = 0.608$ for 2005-2009. Parameter values for 2000-2004 and those for 2005-2009 are shown in the columns of Robustness check (4) and (5) in Table 4, respectively. The calibration results and counterfactual analysis for 2000-2004 and those for 2005-2009 are presented in the columns of Robustness check (4) and (5) of Tables 2 and 3, respectively. For 2000-2004, elimination of moving costs lowers un_N by 49.5% and increases S by 31.7% whereas a 30% productivity increase lowers un_N by 28.0% and CV by 4.27%, and increases S by 33.3%. For 2005-2009, elimination of moving costs lowers un_N by 46.4% and increases S by 31.8% whereas a 30% productivity increase lowers un_N by 25.5% and CV by 25.0%, and increases S by 33.6%. Thus, the effects of moving costs are very similar over these periods and comparable to the effects of a 30% productivity increase. The only difference between these periods lies in the effect of productivity improvements on the unemployment differential, which is smaller for the early 2000s than for the late 2000s.

6 Concluding remarks

In this study, we developed a multi-region job search model and analyzed the impacts of moving costs both qualitatively and quantitatively. By qualitative analysis, we showed that shocks to a particular region, such as a productivity shock or improvement in access to another region, cause spillover effects to other regions through migration responses. We proved that equilibrium is inefficient in the presence of moving costs. Thus, moving costs reduce the social welfare not only because they decrease the social surplus when migration takes place but also because they cause distortions. We also examined the overall

losses from moving costs quantitatively. We calibrated our framework to Japanese prefectural data and demonstrated by a counterfactual simulation that the impacts of disappearance of moving cost on the economy would be comparable to those of a 30% productivity improvement in all regions.

We briefly mention the limitations and possible extensions of our model. First, in order to concentrate our attention on the analysis of migration patterns, we ignored one important dimensions related to migration and labor market integration. As shown in Miyagiwa [12] and Wildasin [25], labor market integration enhances human capital accumulation and specialization. Moreover, it may affect investments of firms. Although incorporating these investment decisions into our framework would not change the efficiency results because investment decisions are known to be efficient in a competitive search model (e.g., Acemoglu and Shimer [2]; Masters [11]), it would amplify the effects of migration: a region receiving large migration or having better access from other regions enjoys the benefits of larger investments whereas such benefits are absent in a region experiencing out-migration or having poor access from other regions.

Second, we represented moving costs as a function of distance between regions in the quantitative analysis. However, this is evidently a coarse approximation: A region having better transportation infrastructure such as a hub airport may be easier to move to and from than a region without it, for example. Indeed, Nakajima and Tabuchi [17] discussed that there exist a case in which one should exclude distances when estimating moving costs (a case in which there is no employment uncertainty

and migration takes place based on utility differentials). Fortunately, our framework does not correspond to such a case. Still, it would be worth exploring a better description of moving costs than ours, which may include the existence of distance-irrelevant costs.

Third, related to the second point, we may be able to endogenize moving costs. One possible way is to introduce housing loans. Suppose that people buy houses by using mortgage loans. If negative productivity shocks hit a region, the income level and housing price would decline. Then, people may want to move to another region. This would require people to repay the mortgage loans. However, if decreases in the income level and housing price were sufficiently large, people can not do so because selling their houses at a sufficiently high price becomes difficult. Thus, mortgage loans may act as moving costs in the face of economic fluctuations.

Finally, our framework can be extended to represent the relationships between countries. For instance, we can consider an expansion of the European Union (EU). We would then be able to examine the possible impacts of accession of a new member country on each member country's labor market and overall EU labor market. All these are important topics for future research.

Appendices

Appendix A: *Proof of Proposition 1.*

Define Γ_i as

$$\Gamma_i(U_i) \equiv rU_i - b - \sum_{h=1}^H \left[p_{ih} \left(\frac{y_h}{r} - U_i - t_{ih} \right) - k\theta_{ih} \right].$$

If the equation $\Gamma_i(U_i) = 0$ has a unique solution for all i , we know that there exists a unique steady state equilibrium. Equation (7) is rearranged as

$$k = \frac{dp_{ij}}{d\theta_{ij}} \left(\frac{y_j}{r} - U_i - t_{ij} \right), \quad (15)$$

which, combined with the Inada condition of the matching function, implies that θ_{ij} and p_{ij} are positive when U_i is equal to zero and that θ_{ij} and p_{ij} converge to zero as U_i goes to $y_j/r - t_{ij}$. Hence, letting \bar{U}_i denote $\max[y_i/r, \max_j[y_j/r - t_{ij}]]$, we readily know that

$$\begin{aligned} \Gamma_i(0) &< 0, \\ \Gamma_i(\bar{U}_i) &= r\bar{U}_i - b \geq y_i - b > 0. \end{aligned}$$

Note that even though $\Gamma_i(U_i)$ may be kinked at $U_i = y_j/r - t_{ij}$, it is continuous at $U_i \in [0, \bar{U}_i]$. Thus, $\Gamma_i(U_i) = 0$ has at least one solution in $[0, \bar{U}_i]$, which shows the existence.

$\Gamma_i(U_i)$ may not be differentiable at $U_i = y_j/r - t_{ij}$. However, except for these points, it is differentiable, and by differentiating $\Gamma_i(U_i)$ with respect to U_i , we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d\Gamma_i(U_i)}{dU_i} &= r + \sum_h p_{ih} - \sum_h \frac{\partial [p_{ih} (y_h/r - U_i - t_{ih}) - k\theta_{ih}]}{\partial \theta_{ih}} \frac{\partial \theta_{ih}}{\partial U_i} \\ &= r + \sum_h p_{ih} > 0, \end{aligned}$$

where the second equality comes from (15). Combined with the continuity of $\Gamma_i(U_i)$, this proves that the solution of $\Gamma_i(U_i) = 0$ is unique.

Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2.

From (1) and (3), we have

$$rU_i = b + \sum_{h=1}^H \left[p_{ih} \left(\frac{y_h}{r} - U_i - t_{ih} \right) - k\theta_{ih} \right],$$

which yields

$$U_i = \frac{b + \sum_h [p_{ih} (y_h/r - t_{ih}) - k\theta_{ih}]}{r + \sum_h p_{ih}}.$$

From (7), we know that $\theta_{ij} = \arg \max U_i, \forall i, j \in H$. Hence, we readily know that

$$U_j = \frac{b + \sum_h [p_{jh} (y_h/r - t_{jh}) - k\theta_{jh}]}{r + \sum_h p_{jh}} \geq \frac{b + \sum_h [p_{ih} (y_h/r - t_{jh}) - k\theta_{ih}]}{r + \sum_h p_{ih}}.$$

This implies that

$$\begin{aligned}
U_i - U_j &\leq \frac{b + \sum_h [p_{ih} (y_h/r - t_{ih}) - k\theta_{ih}]}{r + \sum_h p_{ih}} - \frac{b + \sum_h [p_{ih} (y_h/r - t_{jh}) - k\theta_{ih}]}{r + \sum_h p_{ih}} \\
&= \frac{\sum_h p_{ih} (t_{jh} - t_{ih})}{r + \sum_h p_{ih}} \\
&\leq \frac{\sum_h p_{ih} t_{ij}}{r + \sum_h p_{ih}} \\
&\leq t_{ij},
\end{aligned}$$

where the second inequality comes from the triangle inequality $t_{jh} \leq t_{ji} + t_{ih} = t_{ij} + t_{ih}$. Similar arguments show that $U_j - U_i \leq t_{ij}$.

Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 3.

Suppose temporarily that U_i is fixed. Differentiation of (7) with respect to $y_j - rU_i - rt_{ij}$ yields

$$0 = \frac{dq_{ij}}{d\theta_{ij}} (y_j - rU_i - rt_{ij}) \frac{\partial \theta_{ij}}{\partial (y_j - rU_i - rt_{ij})} + q_{ij}.$$

Plugging $q_{ij} = p_{ij}/\theta_{ij}$ and (7) into this, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned}
0 &= \frac{rk\theta_{ij}dq_{ij}/d\theta_{ij}}{q_{ij}(1-\eta)} \frac{\partial \theta_{ij}}{\partial (y_j - rU_i - rt_{ij})} + p_{ij} \\
&= -\frac{rk\eta}{1-\eta} \frac{\partial \theta_{ij}}{\partial (y_j - rU_i - rt_{ij})} + p_{ij},
\end{aligned}$$

which implies that

$$\frac{\partial \theta_{ij}}{\partial (y_j - rU_i - rt_{ij})} = \frac{1-\eta}{\eta} \frac{p_{ij}}{rk} > 0.$$

Also, differentiation of (7) with respect to μ_j gives

$$\frac{\partial \theta_{ij}}{\partial \mu_j} = -\frac{m(1, \theta_{ij}^{-1})}{dq_{ij}/d\theta_{ij}} > 0.$$

Because $dp_{ij}/d\theta_{ij} > 0$, these inequalities imply that $p_{ij} > p_{i'j'}$ if $y_j - rU_i - rt_{ij} > y_{j'} - rU_{i'} - rt_{i'j'}$ and $\mu_j > \mu_{j'}$.

Appendix D: Proof of Propositions 4 and 5.

We start by deriving the effect on the asset value of an unemployed worker, U_i . y_j and t_{ij} affect U_i only through changes in $y_j - rt_{ij}$. Differentiating (11) with respect to $y_j - rt_{ij}$ and using (15), we obtain

$$\frac{\partial U_i}{\partial (y_j - rt_{ij})} = \frac{p_{ij}}{r + \sum_{h \in \hat{H}_i} p_{ih}} > 0. \quad (16)$$

We readily see that $\partial U_i/\partial y_j = \partial U_i/\partial (y_j - rt_{ij}) > 0$ and $\partial U_i/\partial t_{ij} = -r\partial U_i/\partial (y_j - rt_{ij}) < 0$. The effects on the job finding rate, p_{ij} , also appears through changes in $y_j - rt_{ij}$. Differentiation of (7) with

respect to $y_j - rt_{ij}$, combined with (16), yields

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial p_{ij}}{\partial (y_j - rt_{ij})} &= \frac{(1-\eta)^2 p_{ij} q_{ij}}{\eta k} \left(1 - \frac{p_{ij}}{r + \sum_{h=1}^H p_{ih}} \right) > 0, \\ \frac{\partial p_{ij'}}{\partial (y_j - t_{ij})} &= -\frac{(1-\eta)^2 p_{ij'} q_{ij'}}{\eta k} \frac{p_{ij}}{r + \sum_{h=1}^H p_{ih}} < 0,\end{aligned}\tag{17}$$

which lead to $\partial p_{ij}/\partial y_j > 0$, $\partial p_{ij}/\partial t_{ij} < 0$, $\partial p_{ij'}/\partial y_j < 0$, and $\partial p_{ij'}/\partial t_{ij} > 0$. From (6), and by using (16), we obtain the effects on the wage rate:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial w_{ij}}{\partial y_j} &= \eta + (1-\eta) \frac{p_{ij}}{r + \sum_{h=1}^H p_{ih}} > 0, \\ \frac{\partial w_{ij'}}{\partial y_j} &= (1-\eta) \frac{p_{ij}}{r + \sum_{h=1}^H p_{ih}} > 0, \\ \frac{\partial w_{ij}}{\partial t_{ij}} &= (1-\eta) r \left(1 - \frac{p_{ij}}{r + \sum_{h=1}^H p_{ih}} \right) > 0, \\ \frac{\partial w_{ij'}}{\partial t_{ij}} &= -(1-\eta) r \frac{p_{ij}}{r + \sum_{h=1}^H p_{ih}} < 0.\end{aligned}$$

Finally, from (17), we can see that

$$\begin{aligned}\sum_{h=1}^H \frac{\partial p_{ih}}{\partial (y_j - rt_{ij})} &= \frac{(1-\eta)^2 p_{ij} q_{ij}}{\eta k} - \sum_{h=1}^H \frac{(1-\eta)^2 p_{ih} q_{ih}}{\eta k} \frac{p_{ij}}{r + \sum_{h=1}^H p_{ih}} \\ &= \frac{(1-\eta)^2 p_{ij}}{\eta k} \left[\frac{(r + \sum_h p_{ih}) q_{ij} - \sum_h p_{ih} q_{ih}}{r + \sum_h p_{ih}} \right] \\ &= \frac{(1-\eta)^2 p_{ij}}{\eta k} \frac{r q_{ij} + \sum_h p_{ih} (q_{ij} - q_{ih})}{r + \sum_h p_{ih}}.\end{aligned}$$

When $y_j - rt_{ij}$ is sufficiently large, market tightness θ_{ij} is also large and q_{ij} is small, under which $\sum_h \partial p_{ih}/\partial (y_j - rt_{ij})$ is likely to be negative. Because the unemployment rate, un_i , is given by (8), this raises un_i .

Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 6.

The present-value Hamiltonian for the welfare maximization (13) is defined as

$$\begin{aligned}H_\tau &= \sum_{i=1}^H \left[y_i (N_{i\tau} - u_{i\tau}) + b u_{i\tau} - u_{i\tau} \sum_{h=1}^H (k \theta_{ih\tau} + p_{ih\tau} t_{ih}) \right] e^{-\rho\tau} \\ &\quad + \sum_{i=1}^H \lambda_{i\tau}^N \left(\sum_{h=1}^H p_{hi\tau} u_{h\tau} - u_{i\tau} \sum_{h=1}^H p_{ih\tau} \right) + \sum_i \lambda_{i\tau}^u \left(\delta N_{i\tau} - u_{i\tau} \sum_{h=1}^H p_{ih\tau} - \delta u_{i\tau} \right).\end{aligned}$$

Note here that the control variables are $\theta_{ij\tau}$, and the state variables are $N_{i\tau}$ and $u_{i\tau}$. $\lambda_{i\tau}^N$ and $\lambda_{i\tau}^u$ are the

co-state variables. The first-order conditions are given by

$$ke^{-\rho\tau} = \frac{dp_{ij\tau}}{d\theta_{ij\tau}} (\lambda_{j\tau}^N - \lambda_{i\tau}^N - \lambda_{i\tau}^u - t_{ij}e^{-\rho\tau}) = (1 - \eta) q_{ij\tau} (\lambda_{j\tau}^N - \lambda_{i\tau}^N - \lambda_{i\tau}^u - t_{ij}e^{-\rho\tau}) \quad (18)$$

$$\lambda_{i\tau}^N = \frac{y_i e^{-\rho\tau} + \delta \lambda_{i\tau}^u}{r - \delta} \quad (19)$$

$$0 = - \left[y_i - b + \sum_{h=1}^H (k\theta_{ih\tau} + p_{ih\tau}t_{ih}) \right] e^{-\rho\tau} + \sum_{h=1}^H \lambda_{h\tau}^N p_{ih\tau} - \lambda_{i\tau}^N \sum_{h=1}^H p_{ih\tau} - \lambda_{i\tau}^u \left(\sum_{h=1}^H p_{ih\tau} + r \right) \quad (20)$$

where (18) determines the optimal $\theta_{ij\tau}$, and (19) and (20) can be solved to yield $\lambda_{h\tau}^N$ and $\lambda_{i\tau}^u$. We evaluate these values at the steady state. Hence, we don't need τ in the followings and N_i and u_i are determined by $dN_{i\tau}/d\tau = 0$ and $du_{i\tau}/d\tau = 0$.

Equations (18) and (20) yield

$$\lambda_i^u = - \frac{(y_i - b + \eta \sum_h p_{ih}t_{ih}) e^{-\rho\tau} + \eta \sum_h p_{ih} (\lambda_i^N - \lambda_h^N)}{r + \eta \sum_h p_{ih}} \quad (21)$$

Moreover, (19) is rearranged as

$$\lambda_i^N - \lambda_j^N = \frac{(y_i - y_j) e^{-\rho\tau} + \delta (\lambda_i^u - \lambda_j^u)}{r - \delta}. \quad (22)$$

Plugging (19), (20) and (22) into (18), we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} k &= (1 - \eta) q_{ij} \left\{ \frac{(y_i - b + \eta \sum_h p_{ih}t_{ih}) + \eta \sum_h p_{ih} [(y_i - y_h) + \delta (\lambda_i^u - \lambda_h^u) e^{\rho\tau}]/(r - \delta)}{r + \eta \sum_h p_{ih}} \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \frac{(y_j - y_i) + \delta (\lambda_j^u - \lambda_i^u) e^{\rho\tau}}{r - \delta} - t_{ij} \right\} \\ &= \pi_{ij} - \frac{\delta}{r} D_{ij}, \end{aligned}$$

where π_{ij} and D_{ij} are defined as

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_{ij} &\equiv (1 - \eta) q_{ij} \left[\frac{y_j}{r} - t_{ij} - \frac{b + \eta \sum_h p_{ih} (y_h/r - t_{ih})}{r + \eta \sum_h p_{ih}} \right], \quad (23) \\ D_{ij} &\equiv (1 - \eta) q_{ij} \frac{[y_i - b - (r + \eta \sum_h p_{ih}) t_{ij}] - r (\lambda_j^u - \lambda_i^u) e^{\rho\tau} - \eta \sum_h p_{ih} (\lambda_j^u - \lambda_h^u - t_{ih}e^{-\rho\tau}) e^{\rho\tau}}{r + \eta \sum_h p_{ih}} - k. \end{aligned}$$

In equilibrium, because $p_{ij} = \theta_{ij}q_{ij}$, (7) is rewritten

$$rk\theta_{ij} = (1 - \eta) p_{ij} (y_j - rU_i - rt_{ij}).$$

Summing up the both sides of it for $j = 1 \dots H$, we obtain

$$rk \sum_{j=1}^H \theta_{ij} = (1 - \eta) \sum_{j=1}^H p_{ij} (y_j - rU_i - rt_{ij}),$$

which is rearranged as

$$\eta \sum_{j=1}^H p_{ij} \left(\frac{y_j - rU_i - rt_{ij}}{r} \right) = \frac{\eta}{1-\eta} k \sum_{j=1}^H \theta_{ij}.$$

Plugging (1), (6) and the above equation into (3), the asset value of an unemployed worker in equilibrium can be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned} rU_i &= b + \sum_{j=1}^H p_{ij} \left[\frac{\eta y_j + (1-\eta) r (t_{ij} + U_i)}{r} - U_i - t_{ij} \right] \\ &= b + \eta \sum_{j=1}^H p_{ij} \frac{y_j - rU_i - rt_{ij}}{r} \\ &= b + \frac{\eta}{1-\eta} k \sum_{j=1}^H \theta_{ij}. \end{aligned} \quad (24)$$

The second equality implies that

$$U_i = \frac{b + \eta \sum_h p_{ih} (y_h/r - t_{ih})}{r + \eta \sum_h p_{ih}}. \quad (25)$$

Using this, we can rewrite the zero-profit condition (7) as

$$k = (1-\eta) q_{ij} \left(\frac{y_j}{r} - t_{ij} - \frac{b + \eta \sum_h p_{ih} (y_h/r - t_{ih})}{r + \eta \sum_h p_{ih}} \right). \quad (26)$$

Plugging (25) into π_{ij} of (23), we can see that in equilibrium,

$$\pi_{ij} = (1-\eta) q_{ij} \left(\frac{y_j}{r} - U_i - t_{ij} \right),$$

which, combined with (7), implies that $\pi_{ij} = k$ holds true in equilibrium. From this, we know that the equilibrium market tightness is optimal if and only if D_{ij} evaluated at the equilibrium is zero. Moreover, from the second-order condition of firm's optimization (5), the equilibrium market tightness is larger than the social optimum if and only if D_{ij} evaluated at the equilibrium is positive, and the opposite holds true if and only if it is negative.

From (18), we obtain

$$\sum_h p_{ih} (\lambda_h^N - \lambda_i^N) = \frac{k}{1-\eta} \sum_h \theta_{ih} e^{-\rho\tau} + \sum_h p_{ih} (\mu_i^u + t_{ih} e^{-\rho\tau}).$$

Substituting this and (24) into (20), we know that in equilibrium,

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda_i^u &= - \frac{(y_i - b + \eta \sum_h p_{ih} t_{ih}) e^{-\rho\tau} - [\eta/(1-\eta)] k \sum_h \theta_{ih} e^{-\rho\tau} - \eta \sum_h p_{ih} (\mu_i^u + t_{ih} e^{-\rho\tau})}{r + \eta \sum_h p_{ih}} \\ &= - \frac{y_i - rU_i}{r} e^{-\rho\tau} \end{aligned}$$

Using this and (24), we can write D_{ij} of (23) evaluated at the equilibrium as

$$\begin{aligned} D_{ij} &= \frac{(1-\eta) q_{ij}}{r + \eta \sum_h p_{ih}} \left\{ -b + \left(r + \eta \sum_h p_{ih} \right) \left(\frac{y_j}{r} - t_{ij} \right) + \frac{\eta}{1-\eta} k \left(\sum_h \theta_{ih} - \sum_h \theta_{jh} \right) \right. \\ &\quad \left. - \eta \sum_h p_{ih} \left[z_{ih} + \frac{\eta}{1-\eta} \frac{k}{r} \left(\sum_h \theta_{jh'} - \sum_h \theta_{hh'} \right) \right] \right\} - k. \end{aligned}$$

From (26), this can be further rewritten as

$$D_{ij} = \delta \frac{(1-\eta)q_{ij}}{r + \eta \sum_{h=1}^H p_{ih}} \frac{\eta}{1-\eta} \left[k \sum_h \theta_{ih} - k \sum_h \theta_{jh} - \frac{\eta}{r} \sum_h p_{ih} \left(k \sum_h \theta_{jh'} - k \sum_h \theta_{hh'} \right) \right].$$

Finally, from (24), we obtain D_{ij} evaluated at the equilibrium as

$$D_{ij} = \frac{(1-\eta)q_{ij}}{r + \eta \sum_h p_{ih}} \left[r(U_i - U_j) + \eta \sum_h p_{ih}(U_h - U_j) \right].$$

Appendix F: Estimation of the matching function.

Data

Our spatial units are Japanese prefectures. For job status, we use the Monthly Report of Public Employment Security Statistics (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare). It contains numbers of active job applicants, active job openings, and job placements in every month. Here, the number of job placements is available for within prefectures and without prefectures. We use the former in estimating the matching function. To eliminate seasonal volatility, we aggregate monthly data into annual data by taking average. In the analysis, Okinawa prefecture is excluded and hence we have 46 prefectures. We use data for 2000-2009, implying that our sample size is 460. Here, we don't take the average over years because the relationship represented in the matching function is not limited to the steady state. The following table shows the descriptive statistics.

[Table 5 around here]

Empirical strategy

As we explained in Section 5.1, we employ a Cobb-Douglas form of the matching function:

$$\mu_j m(u_{ij}, v_{ij}) = \mu_{jt} u_{ijt}^\eta v_{ijt}^{1-\eta},$$

where t represents time. From the assumption of the constant returns to scale, the matching function can be redefined in terms of a job seeker's job finding rate:

$$f_{ijt} = \mu_{jt} \theta_{ijt}^{1-\eta},$$

where $f_{ijt} = \mu_j m(u_{ij}, v_{ij})/u_{ijt}$ is the job seeker's job finding rate, and $\theta_{ijt} = v_{ijt}/u_{ijt}$ is labor market tightness. In the estimation, f_{ijt} is given by the ratio of the number of job placements to the number of job applicants whereas θ_{ijt} is given by the ratio of the number of job openings to the number of job applicants. By taking the natural logarithm, we can rewrite the matching function as

$$\ln[f_{ijt}] = \ln[\mu_{jt}] + (1-\eta) \ln[\theta_{ijt}].$$

From this, we obtain an estimable equation as follows:

$$\ln[f_{ijt}] = \xi_j + (1 - \eta) \ln[\theta_{ijt}] + \varepsilon_{jt}.$$

We assume that the matching efficiency $\ln[\mu_{jt}]$ can be decomposed into a time-invariant term ξ_j and a time-variant term ε_{jt} . We assume that ε_{jt} satisfies the assumption of the standard error term. Because our data are on the job placements within prefectures, the equation to be estimated becomes

$$\ln[f_{jjt}] = \xi_j + (1 - \eta) \ln[\theta_{jjt}] + \varepsilon_{jt}. \quad (27)$$

In the benchmark case, we estimate (27) by the fixed effect (FE) model. This allows us to deal with the concern that the matching efficiency may be correlated with labor market tightness. For example, existence of efficient matching intermediaries induces more job posting by local firms. If so, time-invariant match efficiency, ξ_j , may be correlated to labor market tightness, $\ln[\theta_{jjt}]$. FE model can be used even in the presence of such correlation between ξ_j and $\ln[\theta_{jjt}]$.

Further, one may be concerned that the time-variant matching efficiency, ε_{jt} , might also be correlated with labor market tightness, $\ln[\theta_{jjt}]$. For example, firms may post their vacancies in response to changes in the labor market's matching efficiency in the current period. If so, $\ln[\theta_{jjt}]$ correlates with ε_{jt} and the standard FE model does not work. To respond this concern, we use instrumental variables in estimating the fixed effect model, which we refer to as FEIV model. We follow several recent studies that estimated the matching function in using lags of market tightness as instruments (see e.g., Yashiv, 2000): we use two periods and three periods lagged labor market tightness, $\ln[\theta_{jjt-2}]$ and $\ln[\theta_{jjt-3}]$, as instruments for labor market tightness, $\ln[\theta_{jjt}]$.¹⁶

Moreover, because we examine the difference between the early and late 2000s, in addition to the baseline analysis that uses the full periods from 2000 to 2009, we separately estimate the matching function (by FE model) for 2000-2004 and for 2005-2009.

Estimation Results

The estimation results are shown in Table 6.

[Table 6 around here]

¹⁶One may concern that the time-variant matching efficiency may serially correlated across periods. In that case, system generalized method of moments (GMM) will work well. Our theoretical model, however, does not allow for the serial correlation of matching efficiency across periods. Because our purpose is counterfactual simulation by using a rigorously built theoretical model, we do not allow serial correlation in matching efficiency, and we do not use system GMM for parameter estimation.

Column (i) shows the result by FE model. The point estimate of η is 0.512 and is significantly different from zero. Column (ii) shows the result by FEIV model. The point estimate of η becomes slightly higher under FEIV model than under FE model. Columns (iii) and (iv) show the results for 2000-2004 and for 2005-2009, respectively. The estimated η is larger for the late 2000s than for the early 2000s.

In the quantitative analysis, we also need matching efficiency, which is captured by the estimated prefectural fixed effects. Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics of the estimated fixed effects for each case.

[Table 7 around here]

On average, estimated matching efficiency is stable across estimation methods and periods.

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Parameters	Values	Description
δ	0.16	Job separation rate
ρ	0.0151	Discount rate
η	0.512	Parameter of the matching function
t	5.348	Moving cost per distance
k	0.0196	Cost of posting a vacancy
y_i	Region specific	Regional output per capita
z_{ij}	Specific between regions	Distance between regions i and j
μ_i	Region specific	Regional fixed components of the matching function
b	1(Normalization)	Flow utility of unemployment
N	1 (Normalization)	Total number of workers

Table 1. Parameter values of the benchmark model.

Notes: The value of ρ comes from Japanese long-term interest rates. The values of δ , y_i , and z_{ij} are taken from Japanese data. We estimated the Japanese matching function to obtain η and μ_i . We normalize the total population, N , and the flow utility of an unemployed worker, b , to one. The remaining two parameters, t and k are chosen by targeting the data listed in Table 2.

	Data			Benchmark	Robustness check				
	(a)	(b)	(c)		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Calibration targets									
Overall unemp. rate, un_N	0.0455	0.0492	0.0418	0.0455	0.0455	0.0455	0.0455	0.0492	0.0418
Unemp. rate differences, CV	0.182	0.187	0.188	0.182	0.182	0.182	0.182	0.187	0.188
Social surplus, S				362.0	362.2	339.0	114.2	334.7	404.0

Table 2. Calibration results.

Notes: Data columns represent different time periods: (a) Years 2000-2009, (b) Years 2004-2009, (c) Years 2005-2009. Benchmark and Robustness check (1)-(3) calibrate Data (a). Robustness check (4) and (5) calibrate Data (b) and (c), respectively.

	Benchmark	Robustness check				
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Counterfactual (no moving cost)						
Overall unemp. rate, un_N	0.0256	0.0260	0.0127	0.0254	0.0248	0.0224
	(-43.7)	(-42.8)	(-72.0)	(-44.1)	(-49.5)	(-46.4)
Unemp. rate differences, CV	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(-100)	(-100)	(-100)	(-100)	(-100)	(-100)
Social surplus, S	466.5	468.6	478.7	140.9	440.9	532.6
	(28.8)	(29.3)	(41.2)	(23.3)	(31.7)	(31.8)
Counterfactual (30% productivity up)						
Overall unemp. rate, un_N	0.0328	0.0333	0.0211	0.0328	0.0354	0.0311
	(-27.9)	(-26.8)	(-53.6)	(-27.9)	(-28.0)	(-25.5)
Unemp. rate differences, CV	0.126	0.125	0.0451	0.126	0.179	0.141
	(-30.7)	(-31.3)	(-75.2)	(-30.7)	(-4.27)	(-25.0)
Social surplus, S	483.9	484.1	424.2	152.2	446.4	540.1
	(33.6)	(33.6)	(25.1)	(33.2)	(33.3)	(33.6)

Table 3. Counterfactual results.

Notes: Robustness check columns represent different cases: (1) FEIV estimation of the matching function, (2) Concave moving costs, (3) Higher discount rate, (4) Years 2000-2004, (5) Years 2005-2009. Percentage changes are in parentheses.

Parameters	Values					
	Benchmark	Robustness check				
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
δ	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
ρ	0.0151	0.0151	0.0151	0.05	0.0159	0.0134
η	0.512	0.574	0.512	0.512	0.456	0.608
t	5.348	4.997	5.399	4.445	6.685	4.852
k	0.0196	0.0127	0.00587	0.0196	0.0292	0.00851

Table 4. Alternative parameter values.

Notes: Columns represent different cases: (1) FEIV estimation of the matching function, (2) Concave moving costs, (3) Higher discount rate, (4) Years 2000-2004, (5) Years 2005-2009

Variables	Observations	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Number of active job openings	460	311451	353851.6	53409	2715521
Number of active job applicants	460	506855.7	475205.2	99061	2630961
Number of job placements	460	27502.22	25779.06	7273	194951

Table 5. Descriptive statistics of data used in estimating the matching function

	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)
Estimation peocedures	FE	FEIV	FE	FE
Estimated η	0.512*** (0.0140)	0.574*** (0.0168)	0.456*** (0.0195)	0.608*** (0.0158)
Constant	-2.574*** (0.00780)	-2.579*** (0.00852)	-2.568*** (0.0136)	-2.582*** (0.00663)
Sample periods	2000 – 2009	2000 – 2009	2000 – 2004	2005 – 2009
Observations	460	322	230	230
Adjusted R^2	0.794		0.841	0.851

Table 6. Estimation results of the matching function.

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. "*", "**", and "***" represent $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$, and $p < 0.01$, respectively.

Estimation procedures	years	Observations	Mean	SD	Min	Max
FE	2000 – 2009	46	1.035833	0.2626529	0.5176032	1.691664
FEIV	2000 – 2009	46	1.033825	0.2502585	0.514943	1.514431
FE	2000 – 2004	46	1.04095	0.2944334	0.5219792	2.035077
FE	2005 – 2009	46	1.031262	0.2372374	0.5140291	1.46129

Table 7. Descriptive statistics of estimated regional matching efficiency.




Figure 1. Description of the model




Figure 2: Prefectural output per employed worker and unemployment rates in Japan averaged over the years 2000-2009
Note: Dots represent the prefectural unemployment rates and the thick line represents the overall unemployment rate